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A Word-And-Flesh Profession:
A Response to White and
Brueggemann
by Marie A. Failinger*
Let me begin by acknowledging that some of us in this audience might
think me arrogant or abrasive to begin an address using the plural "we"
or "us" and to proceed with Christian language and lawyer narrative
language even though I am reasonably sure our assembly here is only
partly Christian and partly lawyers. The "we" language, which assumes
a shared community, at first blush may seem to include everyone; but
many of us are right to be troubled by it, both as a matter of hospitality
and as a matter of telling the truth about the world. Indeed, most of us
may more easily remember that we are a religiously pluralistic
community than recognize that lawyers live in multiple communities or
nomoi with world views that are often as irreconcilable as religious
beliefs. If you are puzzled by that claim, I dare you to put an animal
rights lawyer in the same room with a medical research university
attorney!
In writing the text, I started with "we" as an address, not with "I" or
with "you," because of a common ground I believe I share with both
Professor White and Professor Brueggemann about the way in which
speech remakes the world through a relationship among words, speaker,
and hearer. On one hand, this view of the human encounter as
essentially rhetorical precludes an understanding of speech acts as
purely subjectivist or emotivist self-expression. On the other hand, this
same view of human speech-interaction precludes an understanding of
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law and editor of The Journal of Law
and Religion. Valparaiso University (B.A., 1973; J.D., 1976); Yale University (LL.M.,
1983).
My thanks to theologians Patrick R. Keifert, Diane Jacobson, and Terence Fretheim who
suggested resources for this essay.
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speech acts as mere descriptions of previously discovered or reasoned
truth, either empirical or abstract. Professor White reaffirms this triad
among words, speaker, and hearer with what he has identified as the
"deeply reciprocal" dynamic of language: "Whenever a person wishes to
speak to another, he must speak a language that has its existence
outside himself, in the world he inhabits."1
"For while a person acts both with and upon the language that he
uses, at once employing and reconstituting its resources, his language at
the same time acts upon him."2
"Every writer [and we might add speaker] speaks to an audience and
in doing so of necessity establishes a relationship with that audience
"3
Professor Brueggemann also describes the speech acts between Moses,
Abraham, and their God as community-constituted and relational. He
claims that Israel is a "'culture of interpretation' . . . a set of social
relationships in which the ongoing interpretive act is itself definitional
and constitutive of what mature people do."4
I want to return to a discussion of this triadic relationship among
words, speaker, and hearer. For now, however, I ask you to take the
"we" language I use as what Professor Brueggemann has elsewhere
termed testimonial, 5 an invitation to hear what has happened and what
is the truth; but as only one witness's testimony, indeed, as the
testimony of a corroborating witness to much of what you have already
heard here.
1. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 6 (1984).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 15.
4. Walter Brueggemann, The Endless Task of Interpretation, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1019,
1021 (2002).
5. WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 120-21 (1997).
Brueggemann argues for an interpretation of the Biblical revelation as testimonial. In
trial,
there is a reality in question, and there are different, competing accounts of what
that reality is (or was) .... The actual event, however, is enormously supple and
elusive and admits of many retellings, some of which are only shaded differently,
but some of which are drastically different.
The court, however, has no access to the "actual event" besides the testimony.
It cannot go behind the testimony to the event, but must take the testimony as the
"real portrayal . . . ." [Tihe testimony is a public presentation that shapes,
enjoins, or constitutes reality .... [W]hen the court makes a decision and agrees
to accept some version of reality based on some testimony, the testimony is
accepted as true-that is, it becomes true.
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You have understandably heard much about words today, or more
broadly, speech-acts-the ways in which lawyers and theologians speak
and write to an audience. We are a profession of words, to be sure. We
make and unmake worlds by the way in which we speak and write to
particular others-including Yahweh-in particular contexts. Like
smiths with amazingly clean hands, we have been taught to mimic our
elders, to fire, solder, and polish words while holding before us a "vision
of what is ultimately intended,"' to bring the discipline of craft and
character to bear in our lawyering.
But we are a word and flesh profession. I make this small amend-
ment to what has been said because I believe it is too easy for lawyers
to get lost in their words, to imagine that the world is meaningfully
constituted only by words that make and reflect experience. But the
word and flesh coexist, they depend on each other and upon the
opposition that each makes against the other. We are witnesses to a
struggle where word hides flesh and behind flesh, where flesh hides
word and behind word. We are unmaskers and makers of masks. We
help word and flesh hide from each other, and we expose them, including
the aspects of the flesh which are out of reach (and certainly the control)
of our minds, that is, beyond what might commonly be called experi-
ence-a first word and flesh reality.
Professor White has reminded us of the tentative, broken character of
what we can know and say about truth and justice.7 Professor Bruegge-
mann has reminded us about the riskiness of speaking the word.' Yet
we do claim to be about something that is more than partial, tentative,
illusory, and broken; we claim that there is some ground on which we
can call "law-doing" just or compassionate.
Being a good Lutheran girl, I must join both Professor White in his
skepticism that we will find the truth of justice and Professor Bruegge-
mann in his awe of the human project of telling God that we expect Him
to be just. Standing on Professor White's side for a moment, we who
earn bread advocating the truth of truth cannot forget that word can
hide truth that only flesh can disclose, and flesh can deceive us as only
word can ferret out. If words alone could find falsehood, we would not
bother with cross-examination; computers that can cross-match words
would be enough. In cross-examination, as we wield a transcript in our
hands, throwing the words of previous testimony against the present
witness, words are found out by flesh: the truth becomes apparent in
6. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1033.
7. James Boyd White, How Theology Might Learn From Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1009,
1010 (2002).
8. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1023.
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startled eyes, a damp brow, the way a witness moved in the chair. In
fact, falsehood is so blatantly disclosed in flesh that we usually do not
even need to remind the jury, "Did you see how that witness shifted
uneasily when I questioned him?"
But flesh can also hide what only the word can disclose. My client
Sharon L. flounces down into a chair by my desk, smiling and vigorous,
ready to discuss why the welfare department will not give her more food
stamps. I apprehend that this is a woman at peace, uncowed by the
welfare worker, and seemingly unbroken by the fear that she has hardly
enough food for her kids. As Sharon, still smiling, slowly dusts off each
betrayal by her worthless husband like a painfully remembered
souvenir, I come to understand that flesh is lying to me, that the
serenity was painted on her face - by Valium. All the words in the
world cannot ferret out the truth that only flesh can tell, while the flesh,
impervious to cross-examination, may sometimes be unmasked only by
the word.
Indeed, all of the words in the world cannot bring the justice that only
flesh can bring. In the Biblical story, the dishonest judge finally grants
the widow her justice9 not because of her eloquence, but because she
shows up! He can ignore the validity of her arguments but not the face
which bears down upon him incessantly in her need.1" There are no
possible words that can deliver the justice that our clients, showing up
and staring another person in the face, can get.
Ironically, it is a mark of the word-and-flesh game lawyers play that
we are in it for the masking as well. We humans all need shelter, both
from the True God who comes looking for us in His terrible wrath and
the human self-made gods who come to look for our real selves; both of
them seek to condemn us to death. Like Adam and Eve, we too seek
shelter, not only against God, and not only for our sins, but also for our
sexual intimacies and excretions, our exhausted vulnerability. If the
True God or those human self-appointed gods are able to look upon us
in all our nakedness, we will die. We'll die a real death at the hands of
the real God; and when the human gods get through with us, the shame-
death of being uncovered that they mete on us will seem like a thousand
real deaths. So it is that we lawyers find ourselves in the business of
hiding our Adams and Eves from the gods of state, community, spouse,
9. Luke 18:1-8 (Oxford Annotated). In the story, the judge finally gives in to the
widow, reasoning, "'though I neither fear God nor regard man, yet because this widow
bothers me, I will vindicate her, or she will wear me out by her continual coming." Luke
18:4-5.
10. See, e.g., EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY
194-204 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Duquesne University Press 1969) (1961).
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or parent. With the banal masks of the right to privacy, rules of
evidence, the right against search and seizure, we cover up our clients'
secret sins, and we put figgy leaves over their most intimate human
experiences. Our feebleness as protectors, though, is apparent:
sometimes we can perhaps hide some of our clients' thoughts and words
and closets and selves from John Ashcroft and the police, but though we
try to stand up like Moses for our clients, we cannot hide our collective
Gomorrohic sins from God.
This "hiding-work" is but one example of the way lawyers respond to
the broken life the world may be made to give. Professor White notes
that we bear a creative responsibility here. We can speak reality and
thereby change it;" we can create what is just as real as real life, the
institutions and practices which make it possible for us to have hope, to
believe in an "otherwise," even if we cannot with the naked eye espy that
"otherwise." Or, more darkly, as Professor Brueggemann describes, we
stand, incessant as Abraham, not simply uttering a holiness which we
can only imagine but also bartering with our God to relent on His plan
to destroy our pitiful little world because of our evil, first for the sake of
fifty righteous men, then for ten,'2 and then (as we push beyond the
text) for just our own sake. Yet even though we cannot make a world as
real as the words we speak toward it, even though we cannot know the
really real world toward which we speak, we speak anyway, aware of our
ignorance and uncertainty. Hear what both Professors White and
Brueggemann say: without the tension embedded in our uncertainty
toward the certain, the frayed tautness of rope joining our ignorance and
understanding, there is no earthly hope.
In understanding this human hope, though, let us remember that
word needs flesh just as flesh needs word, two tightly braided strands
for strength. Without flesh, word makes idols, obliterating the tension
between our creatureliness and our creativity. Because words can build
worlds as Professor White suggests, not simply legal institutions but a
whole imagination about how we live and breath and move and, indeed,
about who our God reveals Himself to be, words need a corrective.
Ethicist William May terms this "corrective vision. ' '13 But even vision,
aided by gargantuan telescopes, can take in a whole universe, imagining
through sight what cannot be touched or tasted. Without flesh, which
is here-and-now, grounded in and bounded by what we cannot deny even
if we cannot understand it, words can make the world of Adolf Hitler
11. White, How Theology Might Learn, supra note 7, at 1010-11.
12. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1024-25.
13. WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL
ETHICS 2 (2d ed. 2000).
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into a Garden of Eden; words can convince some that others who recite
Torah or Qur'an are monstrously evil, and still others that men who
must eat each day or die are immortal beings.
Flesh defies word. The experience of bodily hunger breaks apart any
ideology that human beings are gods whose meanings or selves are made
of words. Mortal passion that obliviously gives birth to a squirming,
demanding "other" wrecks precisely the kind of willful constructions of
our world that Professor White describes as the lawyer's or theologian's
work. Hitler's words made a world that almost destroyed more than a
whole race of flesh, and he was not alone in history. But flesh,
overcoming, has borne Jew upon Jew (and Roma upon Roma) into the
world in utter contempt for the now crumbled world made of Hitler's
words.
Flesh reminds us, too, of the impotence of words. My colleague Peter
bounds into my office, his eyes wider than Christmas and literally
leaping for joy like the lame man throwing away his cane at Jesus's
touch. Our clients Wendell and Mary have won a great victory in the
Indiana Supreme Court. The words of the opinion transform their legal
condition as beggars dependent upon the largesse of the Indiana
overseer of the poor into a right to survive! I read, disbelieving; Peter
tries to contact Mary to tell her the good news. But Mary is nowhere to
be found; the words that almost speak Brueggemann's "covenantal
neighborliness" 14 to the poor outcasts of Indiana are as nothing to her.
It seems that once she realized that she would get only words from this
court, only promises that might someday be delivered, she went in
search of real food and a real place to sleep for her husband and
children. If we who are lawyers forget flesh, Mary and her family will
not be fed, no matter how many life-changing words we manage to
weasel into a court opinion.
So too, flesh needs to be challenged by word to hope. Sometimes it is
flesh that looms Evil, cutting the fragile cord that binds reality to
alterity, and lawyers must make words or people will die. Without
lawyers' words, building a place of safety and hiding her within, Darcy
stands hopeless against her batterer, watching the reality of his stone
fist slam against her body even when she thinks she has escaped to a
place of safety.
Of course, the world is harsh; sometimes words are only diffidatio,
gestures of defiance and renunciation of the world that flesh makes.
Juanita M. and I have come back from court where we have been trying
to keep her on welfare benefits so she can finish nursing school, her only
14. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1027.
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real hope of a better life. The judge has mocked her testimony,
especially merry at the cross-examination that discloses that she belly-
dances; then he has ignored her, fiddling with his adding machine. I am
crushed by the court's scorn and defeated by my powerlessness either to
spare her that shame or to shame the judge into humanness. Juanita
tosses her Irish red hair in defiance. Oblivious to the fact that we have
probably lost the case, she is jubilant because for the first time, she has
been able to tell her side to someone who has been made to listen.
Juanita's diffidatio bespeaks hope in the power of words that I cannot
muster at that time, though as it turns out, her hope is more on target
than my despair. When the opinion comes, it turns out that we have
won. Professor White would say, an opportunity "to claim meaning for
[her] experience on the [we might say very hopeless-seeming] conditions
on which it is granted us to do so ....""
In light of this sometimes impotence of words, let me return to the
problem of speaking "we" with which I started, the problem Professor
White more than Professor Brueggemann struggles with. If speaking is
always relational and particular, then is Israel's experience of God only
Israel's and no one else's?"s Or is Jesus's baptism or my baby grand-
son's baptism only meaningful to the Christian community gathered
around the word and water?17 To ask the question a different way, if
as Professor White argues, there is "no easy, authoritative way" to
establish a universal truth, if there is no place from within our tradition
that we can adjudicate its relation to another; s if there is ultimately
no meaning in our tradition except within the circle of those who believe
and assent to it, 9 then what is the point of the Christian lawyer's
testimony after all?
Here I would follow Augustine (and, I think, Professor Brueggemann)
on what is missing in the conversation. Augustine rejects the divorce of
word from flesh, of experience and speaking from embodiment. He
castigates the Stoic's or Platonist's futile attempts to disembody a pure
soul but also rebukes those2° "who are so inclined to sensuality that
they cannot enjoy anything unless they can experience it with their sens-
es."2" Pronouncing that "the word made flesh" was both embodied and
ensouled, Augustine puts forth a new duality: He who lives according
15. White, How Theology Might Learn, supra note 7, at 1011.
16. Compare Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1032-33.
17. See White, How Theology Might Learn, supra note 7, at 1014-15.
18. See id. at 1017.
19. See id. at 1014.
20. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 295-296 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans., 1958).
21. Id. at 296.
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to the spirit lives not against his flesh, but according to the truth, that
is, according to God. He who lives by the flesh lives according to
himself, disparaging the Creator and his creatureliness, abandoning
Goodness 22 "in pursuit of some created good."23
What is missing from our worrying about whether the language of
"we" is an imperialism when it is employed in a story about God, or
about whether theologians, even more than lawyers, are tempted to the
idolatry of speaking outside of the practice of their own tradition and its
assenting community, is our remembrance of dabar: what God speaks
is done.24
What God speaks is done means first that, unlike human activity,
God's speech, act, and fulfillment are not broken apart from each other.
God does not, like lawyers, have to surrender to the fact that in court
His speech does not immediately result in fulfillment, that He cannot
move the unjust judge to compassion for Juanita M. God is not bent to
the reality that even the speech-act of a breakthrough court opinion may
not bring food to the table of Mary and Wendell and their children. God
does not have to acknowledge the possibility, as we lawyers do, that our
speaking/acting may not create meaning and hope in our client's lives,
even with all of the successful courtroom victories we muster.
What God speaks is done: God's revelation is not just a foreign film
for those who pay admission and are willing to read the subtitles. Jesus
the Jew speaks in the synagogue, to be sure, but not only in the
synagogue among the chosen. And God does not just show and tell; not
only is the telling always doing, but God's dabar is as much hidden as
revealed. We may have to be exceedingly careful to acknowledge that
God is a trickster in revealing Himself,25 and that we are also unrepen-
tant tricksters, tricking even ourselves with claims about how and when
God speaks. We must, with Professor Brueggemann, "protest[] against
and resist [] every easy settlement, every positivism, every absolutism
that seeks to close off dynamism of the will of the Holy God encountered
22. Id. at 299-302.
23. Id. at 302.
24. MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 109, 119-20 (1993). Thanks also to
Professor Diane Jacobson from Luther Seminary for reminding me of this concept.
25. See, e.g., Gerhard 0. Forde, Naming the One Who Is above Us, in SPEAKING THE
CHRISTIAN GOD: THE HOLY TRINITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINISM 113-14 (Alvin F.
Kimel, Jr., ed., 1992). Forde eloquently describes one of Luther's key claims, that God is
always "[lying] in wait for us in our attempts to speak of [H]im," and at the same time
hiding Himself "from us in inescapable presence and so will not be caught or used by us.
God ... is . . . 'the absconder,' the one who wills not to be seen by us in [H]is 'naked ma-
jesty.'" Id.
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at Sinai."26 But we must also avoid the temptation to make God as
small as the "we" of particular communities. We must acknowledge that
God's dabar cannot be contained within these communities. God does
precede and shatter the conventions of any community, and every
knee-not just the theologian's or the Christian's, but the philosopher's
and the anthropologist's-must bow, not because coerced, mind you, but
in wonderment at what is spoken, done, and accomplished.2 ' Even if
he or she does not bow at the name of Jesus, and I do not mean to
suggest this to be a trivial difference, every Muslim who surrenders
knows the wall-shattering thunder of the Almighty, every Jew who
davens, every Anishinabe who offers tobacco to the Great Spirit, every
evangelical Christian who lifts her hands to the sky.
Because what God speaks is done, God actually speaks-enacts holiness,
as Professor Brueggemann says, that "'will and energy for neighbor-
building that grounds neighborliness in the deepest measures of
reality."'28 Word and flesh are both vital in this project, on our side as
well as God's. Take eating, a flesh-act. Mark Buchanan argues that
Christians should fast because fasting "teaches us to have God's heart
for the hungry, the oppressed, the naked, the homeless. When we taste
a little brokennness ourselves, we have a greater sense of urgency to
repair for others what is broken. Fasting is meant to scour our gut"
29
so that the idea "of being wholly nourished and sustained by God's
word"3" does not become "a nice, sweet and totally irrelevant idea."3
In the same way, word can scour our gut and teach us how to have God's
heart. So far, empathy. But is there more?
Simone Weil reasoned, "To live the death of a being is to eat it. The
reverse is to be eaten. Man eats God and is eaten by God."32 We who
26. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1021-22.
27. See, e.g., Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1469 (1998). Lesnick describes the
profound response to the experience of awe and wonder, that sense of the sacred
embedded in the mundane, that ... is at the heart of the religious consciousness.
That experience generates an imperative, in religious terms a "call" or a "leading"
to act, and the language of divine sovereignty serves to crystallize that feeling of
being impelled, to keep its force in place in our consciousness, notwithstanding the
inevitable ebbing of the immediate experience itself.
Id. at 1475.
28. Brueggemann, The Endless Task, supra note 4, at 1033.
29. Mark Buchanan, Go fast and live, 118 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 16, 19 (2001).
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id.
32. Alec Irwin, Devoured by God: Cannibalism, Mysticism, and Ethics in Simone Weil,
51 CROSS CURRENTS 257,258 (2001) (quoting SIMONE WEILL, OEUVRES COMPLtkTES VI.2 454
(Paris: Gallimard1997)).
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are Christians sometimes forget that we eat God in the Eucharist
because we do not want to feast on flesh; we want the words only. We
do not want to drink "that blood, that cruelty, and that violence";33 we
want it "leached offT,] [p]ared away[,] [h]idden behind platitudes or the
commonplace appearance of a sweet, languid Jesus" 34 on the cross, not
the blistering flesh, asphyxiation and the dogs eating away at dying
flesh, oblivious to the cruelty.35  We eat that flesh, no less than the
dogs.
Is this no more than cannibalism, flesh sated for the sake of the flesh,
the self, so that we are indeed thrown back on ourselves and our
particular communities for meaning? Luther argued that the Eucharist
was precisely not flesh-eating for the sake of our own individual or
corporate flesh, our own desire to build up personal or collective god-
muscles, any more than the Word is consumed for the sake of our own
power, to make us lawyers the gods ordering our own justice or us
theologians the gods creating our own salvation stories. Rather, the
Eucharist both creates and shatters the boundaries of community. We
eat God's flesh with God's Word (saying, doing, and fulfilling at the same
time) for and with the absolutely other neighbor, as the neighbor does
for and with us.36 Again notice, this is not a human doing and not a
chosen human community. This is God's doing; the Word becomes flesh
and dwells among us, a table to which we are all invited personally, Jew
and Greek, male and female, Osama Bin Laden as much as Mother
Theresa.
If we (those of us who are Christians at least) imagine the communi-
ties in which we live, religious or legal, as self-dependent and self-
33. Barry Moser, Blood & Stone: Violence in the Bible & the Eye of the Illustrator, 51
CROSS CURRENTS 219, 225 (2001).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 225-26.
36. See Kyle A. Pasewark, The Body in Ecstasy: Love, Difference, and the Social
Organism in Luther's Theory of the Lord's Supper, 77 JOURNAL OF RELIGION 511, 514-15
(1997). Pasewark argues that for Luther, the
proper benefit of the sacrament is communicated to the recipient not as a direct
result of the consumption of the sacramental meal but indirectly from the
neighbor. Luther pointedly reverses the radicals' position and constitutes the
proper sacramental act as a triadic event between God, neighbor, and communi-
cant, not a monadic act of the communicant or even a dyadic act between God and
communicant. The other is placed at the heart of the social body.... Luther's
ecstatic theory of the Supper is able to account for participation in the inner life
of another in social relations, to include difference and guilt in productive social
relations, and therefore to attach to others in love because of (rather than in spite
of) the neighbor's real otherness.
Id. at 515-16.
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referential, as "making no sense outside the circle of their own communi-
ty" because they rely on the meaning their believers make out of assent
and not on what God does, we will not only have to worry about the
brokenness or tentativeness of the meaning we within our own
interpretive communities can make. We will come to see that our
communities are inescapably perverse, denying that word and flesh are
only for the sake of God and the absolutely other neighbor, the one
outside.
The miracle of the Christian Eucharist is that the words are no
different than the words we use each waking moment to make our
communal meanings, and the bread no different from our daily bread.
Yet when they are God's Word and God's Flesh, those outside the walls
of the community and those inside stop their enmity and make peace.
To the extent that Christian lawyers need to hide flesh from violent
flesh, to protect word from violent word, we have more than a figgy leaf
of rhetoric, one human being speaking to another in hope for some
glimpse of that alterity where justice flows down like waters. For the
huge arms and welcoming voice of the Word made Flesh are there to
hold our creatureliness. To the extent that word and flesh create worlds,
we do not need to make a sturdy rope between reality and alterity. Here
today and for all is the justice that God speaks and suffers as divine and
human, here amidst the uncertainty, the incompleteness, the inadequa-
cy. Hope becomes not longing, waiting for fulfillment, but fulfillment
standing in solidarity with longing, even for lawyers.
* * *
